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I. INTRODUCTION 
Imagine you want to write a song. You spend years developing the perfect 
story and you pitch it to a record label. In your preliminary review, they inform 
you that your months of work have gone to waste. Your work—while an original 
product of your own mind—is somewhat similar to other existing songs, and the 
label is afraid of being sued for infringement. This is a present reality for many 
creators. 
Our concepts of authorship and copying have changed significantly–specifi-
cally with the emergence of the internet. What once would have required physical 
proximity can now be accomplished via the internet in a matter of seconds. Au-
thors from all around the globe can collaborate, and they frequently do. Geo-
graphic limitations present virtually no constraint on the number of individuals 
that can contribute and access a work. 
Human creativity, however, has remained the same. The idea of originality 
and novelty are now long gone, displaced by our modern understanding of ideas. 
Instead of wholly original works, ideas are generally understood as melting pots 
of the creative works before them. When creating, authors naturally draw on 
their human experience, which necessarily includes the creative works with which 
they have come into contact. Copyright doctrine, however, does not reflect this 
common sentiment. 
The scope of copyright has never truly been defined.1 Although much atten-
tion has been devoted to narrowly defining patent and trademark, the scope of 
copyright remains an unanswered question. As a result, rights holders have re-
sorted to developing private law—through predatory infringement actions and 
broad settlement agreements. These settlements are rarely subject to judicial re-
view, leading to increasingly broad copyright infringement claims. 
This combination of pervasive collaboration, the fundamental nature of hu-
man creativity, and the increased saturation of copyrights presents a unique, im-
pending problem. Copyright thickets—impenetrable licensing barriers—present 
a serious threat to creativity and the sustainability of the public domain. This 
Note therefore makes a simple claim: without tailoring our conception of copy-
ing, indivisible copyrights granted to joint authors will produce a tragedy of the 
anticommons. Fear of infringement liability and high transaction costs will stifle 
the very creation that intellectual property law purports to incentivize. 
What is the scope of copyright? How far may infringement settlements go? 
What are the effects of these settlements on creativity and production? To what 
extent do these effects diverge with the goals of copyright protection? I explore 
these questions below. In Section II, I detail the circumstances, contributions, 
and historical context surrounding this problem. I also explore the nature of hu-
man creativity and highlight the overextension of copyright protection. In 
 
 1 See Ben Depoorter & Robert K. Walker, Copyright False Positives, 89 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 
319, 329-30 (2013). 
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Section III, I develop my central thesis by explaining why this unique combina-
tion of factors will produce a tragedy of the commons, eventually creating an 
anticommons; how the overextension of copyright protection will stifle creativ-
ity; and how the untethered scope of copyright is contrary to the incentives be-
hind copyright law. In Section III.B., I explain that existing defenses to infringe-
ment, both in their inception and their application, are inadequate to protect 
creators in light of this impending issue. Instead, a unique solution must be de-
veloped to tackle this unique problem. In Section III.C., I outline a potential 
solution to the complications that arise when these factors collide. I argue that 
the federal government should develop a three-part plan to attack this looming 
issue. First, the United States Copyright Office should develop a filtering system 
for copyrights that establishes thresholds of protection for certain groups of ar-
tistic works. Second, Congress should amend the Copyright Act to expand judi-
cial review of settlement agreements. Third, Congress should amend the Copy-
right Act and expand defenses to infringement that allow for necessary 
borrowing to occur. 
II. BACKGROUND 
A. HISTORICAL DEFINITION OF AUTHORSHIP 
Authors are central to copyright.2 This centrality demonstrates the im-
portance that our conception of authorship plays in evaluating copyright law to-
day. From its inception, copyright law has been about authors. Technological 
advances and increased collaboration between humans have altered our idea of 
authorship. During the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, authors were gen-
erally understood as isolated beings, creating completely novel works of author-
ship.3 This understanding was a uniquely individualistic view for two reasons.4 
First, authors were romantically singled out and designated as the single, ultimate 
origin of the work of authorship.5 Second, authorship was understood as a highly 
isolated, individualized practice.6 Authorship was “reconceptualized . . . ignoring 
or obscuring the collaborative and cumulative aspects of creation.”7 
 
 2 This is demonstrated by the Intellectual Property Clause, which vests in Congress the 
power of “securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their 
respective Writings and Discoveries.” U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (emphasis added). 
 3 Oren Bracha, The Ideology of Authorship Revisited: Authors, Markets, and Liberal Values in Early 
American Copyright, 118 YALE L.J. 186, 192-93 (2008). 
 4 See id. at 193. 
 5 See id. (“A new, unique, and privileged relationship came to be postulated between the 
work and its sole originator – the author.”). 
 6 See id. 
 7 Id.; see also id. (“At the extreme, the author was represented as creating in perfect isolation, 
and the work was seen as attributable to one direct personal origin.”)(citing JAMES BOYLE, 
SHAMANS, SOFTWARE, AND SPLEENS: LAW AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF THE INFORMATION 
SOCIETY (1996)). 
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Similarly, the author herself was depicted as wholly original in two ways.8 
First, the conception of individual authors was “yet another incarnation” of the 
theory of the author as the origin of the creative work.9 Second, originality was 
equated with novelty.10 “Original works were understood as being completely 
different from those already in existence. Originality in this sense was marked 
with a supposed total break with traditions and existing materials, as opposed to 
their reproduction, reworking, or development.”11 
Questions of who owned such works of authorship also centered on this idea 
of an isolated, completely independent author. Although seemingly simple, much 
debate surrounded ownership rights.12 An interesting proponent for the first 
general copyright act, the Worshipful Company of Stationers and Newspaper 
Makers, were proponents of this individualistic view of authorship.13 The sup-
port offered by members of the Stationers was surprising, and has been the sub-
ject of much historical debate.14 Their efforts, however, ultimately resulted in the 
first modern codification of copyright: the 1710 Statute of Anne.15 “For the first 
time, copyright became a right of authors rather than publishers.”16 
 
 8 Id. 
 9 Id. 
 10 See id. (“The ideal author was imagined as a creator ex nihilo of utterly new things.”). 
 11 Id. 
 12 See id. at 194. 
 13 The Stationers Company, as it was commonly known, was granted a monopoly over the 
publishing industry and was responsible for establishing and enforcing regulations. See id. at 
193 (citing RONAN DEAZLEY, ON THE ORIGIN OF THE RIGHT TO COPY: CHARTING THE 
MOVEMENT OF COPYRIGHT LAW IN EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY BRITAIN (1695-1775), at 31-50 
(2004)). 
 14 This historical debate is beyond the scope of this Note. Henry Mitchell, a copyright 
scholar, argued that the Stationers were acting in their own self-interest. See HENRY C. 
MITCHELL, JR., THE INTELLECTUAL COMMONS: TOWARD AN ECOLOGY OF INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY 35-36 (2005). Jason Guthrie, a doctoral candidate at the University of Georgia, ar-
gues that the motivation was selfish. See Jason L. Guthrie, Authors and Inventors: The Ritual 
Economy of Early American Copyright Law (May 2018) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Uni-
versity of Georgia) (on file with University of Georgia Libraries) (“The primary beneficiaries 
. . . were not necessarily authors themselves, but those with sufficient wealth and infrastructure 
to capitalize upon the production and dissemination of creative works.”). For more infor-
mation about the debate, see Bracha, supra note 3, at 193-94 n.12 (“Scholars disagree whether 
the figure of the author was used strategically by the stationers to preserve their traditional 
privileges in a changing world, or whether it was used as a rhetorical device for attacking the 
stationers and breaking their monopoly.”). 
 15 See Christopher Geiger, Freedom of Artistic Creativity and Copyright Law: A Compatible Combi-
nation?, 8 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 413, 424 (2018) (“The Statute [of Anne] was the first codification 
of modern, public copyright regulations, and the first recorded articulation of the utilitarian 
theory of intellectual property law: that the enforcement of a limited monopoly through regu-
lation of use could incentivize creation.”). 
 16 Mitchell, supra note 14, at 125 (2005). 
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The codification of authorship rights in Statute of Anne did not end the de-
bate. Instead, it fueled a three-decade long debate,17 which concerned the scope 
of an author’s rights over their creative works. Authors sought a perpetual, com-
mon-law property right in their works of authorship.18 Building on the eighteenth 
century definition of author, advocates combined popular natural rights theory 
to justify the treatment of copyright as property.19 Although the “literary prop-
erty debate”20 did not result in a common law property right,21 its idea of author-
ship greatly influenced the Anglo-American conception of copyright.22 “The 
Statute of Anne laid the foundation for all of copyright law to follow.”23 
Prior to the American Revolution, institutional stakeholders still dominated 
copyright.24 These stakeholders, like the Stationers in the early eighteenth cen-
tury, advocated for stronger, common-law-like rights of authorship.25 These ef-
forts, although selfish in nature, have proven to be successful.26 Since the Amer-
ican Revolution and the Copyright Act of 1790, rights continually expanded in 
both subject matter and length of protection.27 
Who qualifies as an author has changed drastically since 1710. While authors 
used to be thought of as individual creators generating completely novel works, 
today’s concept of authorship reflects an understanding that authorship involves 
collaboration. Guthrie explained: 
The emphasis on individual autonomy in romanticism, the artis-
tic articulation of classical liberalism, is the origin of the ‘genius 
author’ archetype. While this mythic figure persists to the present 
 
 17 See Bracha, supra note 3, at 194 (describing the “three-decade long series of cases that 
started in the 1730s” over the scope of copyright ownership). 
 18 See id. 
 19 Natural rights arguments were strengthened by the codification of the “ideal author” in 
the Statute of Anne, which reflected the highly individual idea of authorship. See id. at 193-94; 
see also id. at 194 (“Authors, whose mental labor created intellectual works, were presented as 
owners, and the intellectual works were presented as objects of property. As one contemporary 
writer put it, ‘Labour gives a man a natural right of property in that which he produces: literary 
compositions are the effect of labour; authors have therefore a natural right of property in 
their works.’”) (citing William Enfield, Observations on Literary Property 21 (1774), reprinted in THE 
LITERARY PROPERTY DEBATE: EIGHT TRACTS, 1774-1775 (Stephen Parks ed., 1974)). 
 20 Id. at 194. 
 21 See Bracha, supra note 3, at 194; see also Mitchell, supra note 14, at 35 (“These legal battles 
continued until 1774, when an appeals court explicitly stated that the only copyright is a stat-
utory one.”). 
 22 See id. 
 23 Mitchell, supra note 14, at 34. 
 24 See Jessica Litman, Real Copyright Reform, 96 IOWA L. REV. 1, 11 (2010) [hereinafter Litman, 
Real Copyright Reform] (“American copyright law tilts, and has always tilted, the playing field in 
the distributors favor.”). 
 25 See id. at 11-12. 
 26 Id. 
 27 See id. at 35. 
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day in the discourse of the creative industries, the complexity of 
cultural production in an advances capitalist society challenges 
the legitimacy of any artistic success resulting from individual ge-
nius alone.28 
Exploring the history of copyright doctrine is essential to understanding why it 
has remained stagnant for so long. 
The idea that authorship was a highly individualistic process was never totally 
correct. Art and creativity has always involved building on the creativity of oth-
ers.29 In fact, “[w]hile art has incorporated referential elements practically since 
its inception . . . modern artwork has, arguably, embraced appropriation on an 
even larger scale.”30 Today, authorship is no longer an individual activity, but is 
in fact “a combination of what other men have thought and expressed.”31 Cop-
yright doctrine, however, has remained stagnant. Problems in copyright law arise 
from the importance that borrowing plays in development of new creative 
works.32 A copyright doctrine that relies on outdated conceptions of fundamen-
tal concepts threatens the goals of copyright.33 By not adapting to the modern 
realities of creation and authorship, copyright threatens the very creativity it is 
intended to encourage.   
While the right to copy may seem unfair to rights holders, it is a natural by-
product of the tradeoff inherent in the intellectual property scheme.34 The Su-
preme Court has recognized this, stating that “the copyright law, like the patent 
statutes, makes reward to the owner a secondary consideration.”35 Intellectual 
 
 28 Guthrie, supra note 14, at 10. 
 29 See Depoorter and Walker, supra note 1, at 320 (“Every form of creative expression – 
from the crudest imitation to the highest reaches of originality – draws in part from prior art, 
both in form and in substance.”). 
 30 Geiger, supra note 15, at 429. 
 31 Bracha, supra note 3, at 202. 
 32 See Olufunmilayo B. Arewa, The Freedom to Copy: Copyright, Creation, and Context, 41 U.C. 
DAVIS L. REV. 477, 488 (2007); see also id. (“[A] conception of the creative process that imagines 
that new works are original and autonomous may often be at odds with actual acts of creation 
that in many instances involve copying, collaboration, and other uses of existing works.”). 
 33 See id. at 517. 
 34 As Judge Kozinski put it, “it is the system’s very essence.” White v. Samsung Elec. Am., 
Inc., 989 F.2d 1512, 1517 (9th Cir. 1993) (Kozinski, J., dissenting); see also id. (citing Feist 
Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 350 (1991)) (“This result is neither fair nor 
unfortunate: It is the means by which intellectual property law advances the progress of science 
and art.”); see also Geiger, supra note 15, at 447 (“It is therefore inappropriate to start with the 
assumption that there is some form of harm to the rightsholder when a limitation or statutory 
license is engaged.”); see also Jessica Litman, Revising Copyright Law for the Information Age, 75 OR. 
L. REV. 19, 37 (1996) [hereinafter Litman, Revising Copyright Law] (explaining that using unau-
thorized reproductions as a means of measuring harm is inefficient today and “is a poor ap-
proximation of the copyright owners’ injury”). 
 35 United States v. Paramount Pictures, 334 U.S. 131, 158 (1948); see also Feist Publ’ns, Inc. 
v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 349-50 (1991) (“It may seem unfair that much of the fruit 
7
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property guarantees authors rights in their original works, implicitly leaving room 
for others to build upon these works. This sentiment is notably reflected in one 
of copyright’s most significant limitations, the idea-expression dichotomy and 
the merger doctrine. The idea-expression dichotomy differentiates between facts 
and “ideas” underlying the work, which are not protectable, from the “expres-
sion” of these ideas, which is protectable by copyright law.36  Similarly, the mer-
ger doctrine denies protection to works where the idea and work are so entangled 
that the grant of copyright would monopolize ideas themselves.37 These doc-
trines demonstrate the balancing that already exists in the copyright doctrine. 
Specifically, they demonstrate where courts and Congress have determined that 
the public’s interest in the underlying material is more important than the “crea-
tivity” inherent in these works. While they diminish the rights of a copyright 
holder, they “are necessary to maintain a free environment in which creative ge-
nius can flourish.”38 
B. NATURE OF HUMAN CREATIVITY 
“If I have seen farther, it is by standing on the shoulders of giants.”39 Sir Isaac 
Newton, in 1676, recognized the importance of building on existing knowledge. 
This axiom has become increasingly relevant, specifically in the context of intel-
lectual property rights. Creativity is the building block of creativity. Judge 
Kozinski, when criticizing the expansion of intellectual property protection to 
areas which threatened creativity, cited Isaac Newton.40 He further noted that 
“[a]ll creators draw in part on the work of those who came before, referring to 
it, building on it, poking fun at it; we call this creativity, not piracy.”41 Nothing is 
new because creativity inherently involves building upon that which others have 
created.42 
 
of the [author’s] labor may be used by others without compensation . . .. This result is neither 
unfair nor unfortunate. It is the means by which copyright advances the progress of science 
and art.”). 
 36 The idea-expression was first articulated in Baker v. Seldon, 101 U.S. 99 (1880). See Feist 
Publ’ns, 499 U.S. at 350 (“Facts, whether alone or as part of a compilation, are not original and 
therefore may not be copyrighted.”). 
 37 See Oracle Am., Inc. v. Google Inc., 750 F.3d 1339, 1359 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (“[The merger 
doctrine] provides that, when there are a limited number of ways to express an idea, the idea 
is said to ‘merge’ with its expression, and the expression becomes unprotected.”). 
 38 See White, 989 F.2d at 1516 (Kozinski, J., dissenting). 
 39 Letter from Sir Isaac Newton to Robert Hooke (Feb. 5, 1675/76). 
 40 See White, 989 F.2d at 1515 (Kozinski, J., dissenting). 
 41 See id. (citing Sir Isaac Newton, Letter to Robert Hooke (Feb. 5, 1675/1676)). 
 42 Nash v. CBS, Inc., 899 F.2d 1537, 1540 (7th Cir. 1990) (“Intellectual (and artistic) pro-
gress is possible only if each author builds on the work of others. No one invents even a tiny 
fraction of the ideas that make up our cultural heritage.”); see also Geiger, supra note 15, at 430 
(explaining that the history of “popular music” and popular art as a whole is a history deeply 
engrained in technology and its ability to foster creation by appropriating previous works). 
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United States copyright law does not sufficiently accommodate for the reali-
ties of human creativity.43 Society’s understanding of authorship now accurately 
reflects the realities of copying.44 Copyright law, however, has yet to recognize 
this shift. As a result, “copyright analysis in infringement cases is often based on 
restricted and outdated assumptions about creativity and processes of crea-
tion.”45 The conceptions of authorship and creation as singular, isolated pro-
cesses is at odds with the realities of creation. Therefore, a copyright doctrine 
that rests on an incorrect conception of creativity and authorship may in fact 
punish and disincentivize the creative process rather than promote it.46 
Copyright law has remained stagnant for a variety of reasons. An in-depth 
discussion of the politics behind modern copyright law is beyond the scope of 
this Note. However, an examination of the history of the Copyright Act indicates 
that it most benefits current copyright stakeholders—market leaders in copyright 
dominated industries.47 
Congress has never employed a mechanism to account for the viewpoint of 
the general public to ensure that the statute, in its terms and its effects, does not 
“unduly burden” private, non-commercial use of copyrighted works.48 “As a 
 
 43 Some scholars criticize copyright as a whole, finding it totally incomprehensible and in-
applicable in a modern world. See Litman, Real Copyright Reform, supra note 24, at 3 (“Today, 
title 17 of the United States Code is a swollen, barnacle-encrusted collection of incomprehensible 
prose.”). 
 44 See also Arewa, supra note 32, at 494 (“How a prohibition on copying can be reconciled 
with the reality of borrowing and copying in the creation of new works remains a key point of 
tension in copyright theory.”). See generally infra Section II.A. (discussing the history of the 
definition of “authorship”). 
 45 Arewa, supra note 32, at 480. 
 46 See id. at 488 (“Consequently, a conception of the creative process that imagines that new 
works are original and autonomous may often be at odds with actual acts of creation that in 
many instances involve copying, collaboration, and other uses of existing works.”); see also Jerry 
Brito, Why Conservatives and Libertarians Should Be Skeptical of Congress’s Copyright Regime, in 
COPYRIGHT UNBALANCED: FROM INCENTIVE TO EXCESS (Jerry Brito ed., 2012) (“But if it is 
too strong, then it will limit the public’s ability to enjoy and build on creative works, which 
after all is the reason why we have copyright in the first place.”); see also Litman, Real Copyright 
Reform, supra note 24, at 16 (explaining that a system that treats creative use as merely a “toler-
ated use”, rather than encouraged or promoted “is not a system designed to encourage the 
creative enjoyment of copyrighted works”). 
 47 Litman, Revising Copyright Law, supra note 34, at 22-23 (“Until now, our copyright law has 
been addressed primarily to commercial and institutional actors who participated in copyright-
related businesses. The statute seems on its face to have been drafted primarily for the benefit 
of people with ready access to copyright counsel.”); see Litman, Real Copyright Reform, supra note 
24, at 11-12 (describing that the copyright statutes favor institutional actors because Congress 
has encouraged these actors “to write a law that works for them”). 
 48 See Litman, Revising Copyright Law, supra note 34, at 23; see also Litman, Real Copyright Reform, 
supra note 24, at 8 (citations omitted) (explaining that if modern copyright presents difficult 
entry barriers for creators and users, “then the system fails to achieve at least some of its 
purpose”). 
9
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result, IP law almost exclusively favors publishers and authors.”49 The  ultimate 
goal of intellectual property rights, per the terms of the Constitution,50 is to re-
turn information to the public domain in order to benefit the general public and 
enable creativity.51  “Copyright is said to be a bargain between the public and 
copyright holders.”52 Therefore, excluding the public from the negotiating table 
is contrary to a central goal of intellectual property rights. Many scholars argue 
that in order to best reflect the goals of intellectual property rights, it is essential 
to involve the general public in the drafting process.53 
Internationally, copyright law has evolved to represent modern realities. Un-
like the United States, “major sources of international law . . . recognize freedom 
of artistic creativity explicitly, or implicitly, as an inherent element of the right to 
freedom of expression.”54 Canada, for example, recently modernized its copy-
right statute in a similar way. Section 29.21 of the Canadian Copyright Moderni-
zation Act states: 
It is not an infringement of copyright for an individual to use an 
existing work or other subject-matter or copy of one, which has 
been published or otherwise made available to the public, in the 
creation of a new work of other subject-matter in which copy-
right subsists and for the individual –- or, with the individual’s 
authorization, a member of their household –- to use  the new 
work or other subject-matter or to authorize an intermediary to 
disseminate it.55 
The international adaptation of copyright law in light of new understandings of 
creativity and authorship indicates that real problems exist within the old regime. 
Just as the printing press and software inspired change, so should the newfound 
understanding of the realities of human creativity. 
 
 49 Mitchell, supra note 14, at 13. 
 50 See Litman, Revising Copyright Law, supra note 34, at 32 (“We can begin with the assertion 
that the public is entitled to expect access to the works that copyright inspires.”). 
 51 See Miriam Bitton, Modernizing Copyright Law, 20 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 64, 75 (2011) 
(“Promoting learning and preserving the public domain are important factors in the social 
bargain struck in copyright law.”); see also Litman, Real Copyright Reform, supra note 24, at 15 
(stating that a copyright framework that makes the acts of listening, reading, and enjoying less 
likely is counterproductive to the goals of copyright). 
 52 Litman, Revising Copyright Law, supra note 34, at 31. 
 53 See id. at 23; see also id. at 35 (“Congress did not incorporate specific exemptions for the 
general population in most of these enactments because nobody showed up to ask for them.”). 
See generally Mitchell, supra note 14, at 13. 
 54 Geiger, supra note 15, at 419. 
 55 Copyright Modernization Act, S.C. 2012, c. 20, § 29.21 (Can.). 
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C. TRAGEDY OF THE ANTICOMMONS 
The threat of an anticommons is present in copyright. “Nonetheless, scholars 
have generally downplayed concerns about a copyright-induced anticom-
mons.”56 In order to effectively understand how these factors combine to create 
an anticommons, it is important to first define what an “anticommons” is. I use 
the term “anticommons” to refer to Michael Heller’s concept of the “tragedy of 
the anticommons.” 
An anticommons, by definition, exists where “multiple owners are each en-
dowed with the right to exclude others from a scarce resource, and no one has 
an effective privilege of use.”57 When there are too many rights holders, each 
with the ability to exclude, the resource is prone to underuse.58 Those seeking to 
effectively use the property must independently negotiate and obtain consent 
from all of the rights holders. Heller recognizes that, “[e]ven if one party opposes 
the use, that party may be able to block others from exercising their rights.”59 
The tragedy, that underconsumption leads to the waste of a resource, results 
from rational individuals acting separately rather than collaboratively. To Heller, 
this is as equally a “tragedy” as that which plagues the commons.60 
As a matter of scale, tragedy of the anticommons issues become more threat-
ening as both the number of rights grows and the number of individuals holding 
these rights grows. Simply put, the more resource that exists, the higher the prob-
ability that the resource will be misused. Accordingly, the prevalence of overlap-
ping exclusion rights in a single resource increases the probability that any one 
of these owners will use their power to inhibit their co-owners “effective use”. 
The increasingly collaborative nature of creativity is one illustration of a situ-
ation where an anticommons may develop. For example, the products of joint 
authorship are likely to include a multiplicity of overlapping exclusion rights be-
cause of the historical construction of joint authorship.61 As a result, any one of 
the joint authors has the theoretical ability to prevent any or all of their fellow 
joint authors from licensing the product to new creators who wish to build on 
the work. 
 
 56 Clark D. Asay, Software’s Copyright Anticommons, 66 EMORY L.J. 265, 329 (2017). 
 57 Michael A. Heller, The Tragedy of the Anticommons: Property in the Transition from Marx to 
Markets, 111 HARV. L. REV. 621, 623 (1998) [hereinafter Heller, Anticommons] (“One can un-
derstand anticommons property as the mirror image of commons property.”). 
 58 See id. at 624. 
 59 Id. at 639. 
 60 See id. at 688. 
 61 This example will be used throughout this Note to illustrate some of the problems within 
the copyright system. 
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D. OVEREXPANSION OF COPYRIGHTS IN RECENT HISTORY 
We have a problem. As Judge Kozinski put it, “[o]verprotection stifles the 
very creative forces it’s supposed to nurture.”62 While protection of intellectual 
property rights is important to incentivize creation, the present scope and ap-
plicability of copyright protection threatens this very incentive system.63 Intellec-
tual property rights “involve intangible subject matter” and thus, “the metes and 
bounds of the rights are more abstract.”64 Copyright presents a unique problem 
in the intellectual property context because no registration is required to ensure 
protection against later infringement.65 Further, unlike patent and trademark pro-
tection, the scope of copyright protection is much more broad.66 
This uncertainty is only exacerbated by the constant development of new 
technology.67 “The extension of the field of copyright in the last two hundred 
years can be understood as the system being extended in response to changes in 
technology: new kinds of work being found to deserve copyright protection.”68 
 
 62 White v. Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc., 989 F.2d 1512, 1513 (9th Cir. 1993) (Kozinski, J., 
dissenting). But see Bitton, supra note 51, at 77-78 (explaining that William Landes and Richard 
Posner believe that extensive protection creates a larger incentive to create intellectual prop-
erty with the “net result” being more works that will eventually enter the public domain). 
 63 See White, 989 F.2d at 1516 (Kozinski, J., dissenting) (“Intellectual property rights aren’t 
free: They’re imposed at the expense of future creators and of the public at large.”); see also 
Bitton, supra note 51, at 66 (“[T]he over-propertization of information. . .leads to the gradual 
contraction of the public domain.”); see also id. at 68 (“The intellectual property clause is in 
effect an exception to the rule that all knowledge, information goods and expression reside in 
the public domain.”). 
 64 See Depoorter & Walker, supra note 1, at 329 (citing Peter S. Menell & Micahel J. Meurer, 
Notice Failure and Notice Externalities, 4 J. LEG. ANALYSIS 1, 21 (2012)). 
 65 See id. at 329-30 (“[C]opyrights inure at the moment of fixation without any procedural 
or substantive inquiry into their scope.”) (first citing 17 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1072; then citing 17 
U.S.C. § 410); see also id. at 329 (“Because intellectual property rights involve intangible subject 
matter, the metes and bounds of the rights are more abstract.”). 
 66 See 17 U.S.C. § 102 (2018) (“Copyright protection subsists. . .in original works of author-
ship fixed in any tangible medium of expression, now known or later developed. . . .”) (emphasis 
added); see also Depoorter & Walker, supra note 1, at 330 (explaining that the copyright holder’s 
“original expression is protected, but the amount of originality [their] expression contains is 
often not readily discernible from the work on its face”) 
 67 Copyright law has also expanded as a result of the doctrine’s clash with technological 
advancements. As Litman characterized it, “[c]opyright law’s confrontation with evolving 
technology has been a near constant theme since congress enacted its first copyright law in 
1790.” Litman, Real Copyright Reform, supra note 24, at 3; see also Guthrie, supra note 14, at 3 
(stating that copyright law has “struggled to keep up with changes in technology” since its 
enactment in 1790). See Depoorter & Walker, supra note 1, at 331, for more information about 
technology’s impact on copyright (“The boundary uncertainties in copyright are compounded 
by the unique relationship between copyright law and new technology.”). See generally id. at 332 
(“Similarly, uncertainty as to the nature and likely impact of new technologies on copyright 
holders makes it harder for courts to counter excessive claims by way of summary judgment 
or other procedural safeguards.”). 
 68 Mitchell, supra note 14, at 131. 
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Copyright, when compared to other intellectual property rights, has a unique re-
lationship with technology.69 Technological adaptations “enable novel ways to 
enjoy copyrighted content,” causing “difficult questions [to] arise about the legal 
status of a new technology or users’ actions.”70 New technologies challenge the 
fundamental framework of copyright law and litigation, specifically, what quali-
fies as a copy, the scope of the exclusion right, and what belongs to the public 
domain.71 As a result, boundary issues are pervasive, often resulting in overex-
tended and overbroad claims by copyright holders.72 
Technological change has drastically expanded the scope of copyrightable 
subject matter. Copyright historically protected a relatively small number of 
works and provided narrow exclusion rights for a limited amount of time.73 This 
limited scope of copyright left ample space for downstream use and public en-
joyment without much concern for potential infringement liability.74 Over time, 
the gradual increase of what qualifies for copyright protection has expanded be-
yond the contemplated “[w]ritings and [d]iscoveries.”75 For example, “[c]opy-
right law currently contains specialized protection for boat hulls or decks.”76 This 
expansion has been justified by the courts’ reluctance to engage in discussion 
about artistic value of works of authorship. This “dangerous undertaking”77 has 
led courts to overextend copyrights, protecting works that were not contem-
plated by drafters of the intellectual property clause. Some scholars, like Mitchell, 
argue that this broadening of protection represents a complete divergence from 
the purpose of copyright law.78 The Ninth Circuit has also recognized this prob-
lem. In Garcia v. Google, it observed that “[t]reating every acting performance as 
 
 69 Copyright law has expanded as a result of the doctrine’s clash with technological ad-
vancements. See Litman, Real Copyright Reform, supra note 24, at 3 (“Copyright law’s confronta-
tion with evolving technology has been a near constant theme since Congress enacted its first 
copyright law in 1790.”). See generally Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Napoleon Sarony, 111 
U.S. 53 (1884) (expanding copyright’s definition of “authorship” and “writing”). 
 70 Depoorter & Walker, supra note 1, at 331. 
 71 See id. at 331-32. 
 72 See id. at 324-25; see also Litman, Real Copyright Reform, supra note 24, at 14 (explaining that 
as technology has enabled more widespread individual use by creating new ways of enjoyment, 
“copyright owners have asked for greatly enhanced control over their works”). 
 73 See Note, supra Section III.A.; see also Litman, Real Copyright Reform, supra note 24, at 13; see 
also id. at 38 (“For most of our history, copyright laws were case more narrowly than they are 
today. . . .”). 
 74 See Litman, Real Copyright Reform, supra note 24, at 13. 
 75 U.S. CONST. art I, § 8, cl. 8; see Andrew Beckerman-Rodau, The Problem with Intellectual 
Property Rights: Subject Matter Expansion, 13 YALE J.L. & TECH. 35, 64 (2011) (“The history of 
copyright law has been one of gradual expansion in the types of works accorded protection 
. . . .”) (citing H.R. Rep. No. 94-1476, at 5 (1976)). 
 76 Beckerman-Rodau, supra note 75, at 65-66 (citing 17 U.S.C. §§ 1301, 1305(a), and 1309 
(2018)). 
 77 Bleinstein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 251 (1903) (coining the Blein-
stein “aesthetic nondiscrimination principle”). 
 78 See Mitchell, supra note 14, at 132-33. 
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an independent work would not only be a logistical and financial nightmare, it 
would turn case of thousands into a new mantra: copyright of thousands.”79 If 
copyright law is meant to protect “the useful arts,” then it is difficult to under-
stand how granting protection to any work of original expression without regard 
to its social value fits within this goal. 
The advent of new technologies, however, has blurred the lines of what is 
and what should be protected.80 These technologies have increased the likelihood 
and actual frequency of copyright infringement, resulting in a massive decline in 
revenue for rights holders.81 Recent technological advancements—specifically 
the internet—have caused a panic. Afraid of new methods of infringement that 
accompany this new technology, rights holders have responded by “aggres-
sive[ly] ramping up enforcement.”82 
Copyright duration has also significantly increased. Originally, works of au-
thorship entered the public domain after fourteen years and could be extended 
another fourteen years, provided that the author was alive at the end of the first 
term.83 Today, for original works of authorship, protection lasts for the duration 
of the author’s life plus seventy years.84 This continual expansion of copyright’s 
term of enforceability is concerning for two reasons.85 First, creators are not 
providing any additional benefit to the public for the benefit they are receiving. 
Therefore, arguably, the public domain suffers as a result of this transaction.86 
Second, the extensive duration of copyright inches toward a common-law 
 
 79 Garcia v. Google, Inc., 786 F.3d 733, 742-43 (9th Cir. 2015). 
 80 See Litman, Real Copyright Reform, supra note 24, at 13 (“As technology has enabled indi-
viduals to enjoy works in new ways, however, copyright owners have asked for greatly en-
hanced control over their works.”); see also White v. Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc., 989 F.2d 1512, 
1513 (9th Cir. 1993) (Kozinski, J., dissenting)(“Overprotecting intellectual property is as harm-
ful as underprotecting it. . ..Overprotection stifles the very creative forces it’s supposed to 
nurture.”); see also Depoorter & Walker, supra note 1, at 327 (“[C]opyright enforcement in the 
digital era faces an unprecedented problem relating to the frequency and severity of false pos-
itives.”). 
 81 See Depoorter & Walker, supra note 1, at 332. 
 82 See id.; see also White, 989 F.2d at 1516 (Kozinski, J., dissenting)(“Future Vanna Whites 
might not get the chance to create their personae, because their employers may fear that some 
celebrity will claim the persona is too similar to her own.”); see also Litman, Real Copyright Reform, 
supra note 24, at 13 (“As technology has enabled individuals to enjoy works in news ways, 
however, copyright owners have asked for greatly enhanced control over their works.”). See 
generally Lenz v. Universal Music Corp., No. 5:07-cv-03783-JF, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9799 
(N.D. Cal. Jan. 24, 2013). 
 83 See Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 194 (2003). 
 84 17 U.S.C. § 302(a) (2018); see also 17 U.S.C. § 302(c) (2018) (dictating that for anonymous 
works, works under a pseudonym, and works for hire, the term is either 95 years from date of 
publication or 120 years from the date of creation, whichever is shorter). 
 85 See Beckerman-Rodau, supra note 75, at 66-67. 
 86 See id.; see also White v. Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc., 989 F.2d 1512, 1516 (9th Cir. 1993) 
(Kozinski, J., dissenting) (explaining that intellectual property rights that are not limited “im-
poverish[] the public domain, to the detriment of future creators and the public at large”). 
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property right, departing from the Constitution’s express limitation on intellec-
tual property rights.87 
 
1. Settlement Agreements and Copyright Scope 
Copyright overexpansion and high costs have developed an area of private 
law that itself defines the scope of copyright. Enforcement of copyright infringe-
ment, because of its expense—both in litigation and potential damages—rarely 
sees its day in court.88 Potential defendants against infringement suits are incen-
tivized into settling overly broad claims, where infringement may not even ex-
ist.89 This, “in turn, creates and perpetuates uncontested false positives.”90 Fear 
of expensive litigation and potential liability keeps would-be-defendants out of 
the court’s watchful eye.91 Thus, through settlement agreements, rights holders 
have developed a massive body of private law that defines the boundaries of 
copyright. Further, “[b]ecause push back from accused infringers will likely be 
minimal,” copyright holders are incentivized to aggressively assert claims of in-
fringement, including overly broad claims.92 As a result, these “false positives” 
spark fears of liability and produce “chilling effects among creative artists.”93 
For many, defending against infringement is simply beyond their means.94 To 
illustrate the fear that potential infringers face, it is important to note that litiga-
tion for small copyright claims will cost defendants, on average, around $303,000 
through discovery and $521,000 through trial.95 Notably, these costs do not 
 
 87 See Beckerman-Rodau, supra note 75, at 67. 
 88 I come to this conclusion by virtue of reading a variety of sources. The frequency of 
settlements coupled with the DMCA takedown procedures indicates that most allegations of 
infringement never reach a courtroom. 
 89 See Depoorter & Walker, supra note 1, at 322-23; see also id. at 321-22 (“[E]ven if success-
fully challenged by alleged infringers, the litigation costs involved in correcting enforcement 
errors impose a burden on creative expressions and the rightful exercise of public rights and 
copyright exceptions.”). 
 90 Id. at 321. 
 91 See id. at 325 (“This disparity between likely costs and benefits inhibits wrongly accused 
infringers from opposing copyright infringement actions.”). 
 92 See id. at 338. 
 93 See id. at 322-23; see also id. at 341 (“This chilling effect is especially strong for forms of 
creative expression, such as parody, which rely on imitation and copying for their efficacy.”). 
This is troubling considering that the Supreme Court and the Eleventh Circuit have recognized 
the importance of parody as further development of culture by criticizing and building upon 
previous works. See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 579 (1994) (discussing 
parody in the context of fair use and recognizing the importance of copying in parody); see also 
SunTrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 268 F.3d 1257, 1271 (11th Cir. 2001) (noting that 
the transformative use of parody is in its social benefit). 
 94 See Depoorter & Walker, supra note 1, at 343; see also id. at 321-22 (“In practice, . . . litiga-
tion costs involved in correcting enforcement errors impose a burden on creative expressions 
and the rightful exercise of public rights and copyright exceptions.”). 
 95 See id. at 343. 
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include potential statutory damages and plaintiff’s attorney’s fees, all of which 
together make settlement a very compelling option.96 
The “disparity between likely costs and benefits” prevents individuals from 
countering wrongful infringement suits.97 Such disparity, coupled with high stat-
utory damages and attorney’s fees, “provide a strong incentive” for defendants 
to settle, even if the infringement claim is weak at best.98 Frequent settlement of 
overly broad claims creates a “sheen of legitimacy” because the copyright holder 
can point to previous settlements as evidence of the scope of their copyright, 
and therefore, “proof of the validity of their claim in future litigation.”99 Thus, 
private enforcement via litigation settlement suppresses creativity and progress 
by granting exclusion rights to works that fall beyond the scope of copyright 
law’s protected class.100 As a result, this leads to “rent-seeking” by rights holders, 
which increases transaction costs by increasing the cost of licensing across the 
board.101 Since licensing requires the authorization of the rights holder, there 
remains a risk of copyright blocking; placing a large burden on would-be authors 
and creators.102 
Furthermore, defendants who do oppose infringement actions are at a severe 
disadvantage. Because most lawsuits settle, the risks associated with litigation are 
comparatively small for copyright holders. Where the suits do not end in settle-
ment, alleged infringers must overcome the significant hurdle of the copyright’s 
per se validity, an extremely daunting task.103 “So, from an economic perspective, 
 
 96 See id. at 343-44; see also Litman, Real Copyright Reform, supra note 24, at 20 (“Failing to 
cross all the t’s and dot the right i’s, even with the assistance of counsel, is a good way to find 
your business sued into bankruptcy.”); see also id. at 11 (explaining that individual creators can-
not efficiently navigate the current copyright licensing system). 
 97 Depoorter & Walker, supra note 1, at 325. 
 98 See Depoorter & Walker, supra note 1, at 343; see also Guthrie, supra note 14, at 11 (“Even 
those content creators with the most legitimate claims to ‘genius’ have some level of depend-
ence upon legal representatives, publishers, marketing professionals, and other members of 
the creative industries.”). 
 99 See Depoorter & Walker, supra note 1, at 341 (As a result, these overly broad claims “take 
on the appearance of legitimacy in a way roughly analogous to an unauthorized tenant accruing 
rights through adverse possession”). 
 100 See Bitton, supra note 51, at 71 (“Too much protection effectively provides exclusivity of 
ideas and information, as well as expression.”); see also Depoorter & Walker, supra note 1, at 
341 (“By squatting on rights that are not lawfully granted, false positives cause a diminution 
of the public domain and simultaneously reduce the amount of material that is per se available 
for use by others for expressive purposes.”). 
 101 See Depoorter & Walker, supra note 1, at 345. 
 102 See Geiger, supra note 15, at 429 (“As a result, the requirements placed upon outside 
authors for the creation of derivative works are cumbersome.”); see also id. at 417 (“If the orig-
inal author then refuses to grant permission or asks for too high a price, the creative reuse will 
be hindered.”). 
 103 Works that are registered within five years of their original creation are presumed to 
contain only copyrightable material, and subject to minimal review by the Copyright Office 
prior to registration. Successful registration operates as “prima facie evidence” of the copy-
right’s validity, and the burden of the validity is shifted to the alleged infringer, the defendant. 
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copyright holders have an incentive to attempt to enforce their interests as 
broadly as possible, as the foreseeable rewards exceed the accompanying 
risks.”104 
 
2. Licensing Negotiations and Transaction Costs 
Copyright overexpansion and threats of infringement have also privately ex-
panded the scope of copyright. Accordingly, failed licensing negotiations may act 
as de facto private censorship.105 In order to avoid infringement liability, poten-
tial users must obtain licenses from rights holders.106 Therefore, “private entities 
or individuals have the potential to decide what can be created or not.”107 These 
private negotiations and settlements develop an area of private law that is rarely 
subject to judicial review.108 Because of their operation outside of the eye of the 
law, these uncertain, unchecked, broad conceptions of copyright are “endemic 
to copyright by nature and design.”109 Further, compulsory licensing offers cold 
comfort. The principal disadvantage in compulsory licensing, the fact that a judge 
must order the license, favors those actors with more economic resources to 
sustain a time-consuming proceeding.110 Thus, “[w]hile cases are pending, crea-
tivity is hampered.”111 
An illustration of the looming problems with modern U.S. copyright law can 
be found in joint authorship rights. A recent surge of joint authorship, involving 
multiple individual joint authors with their own respective intellectual property 
rights,112 may lead to the production of an anticommons.113 Multiple authors can 
 
17 U.S.C. § 410 (2006). Not only is this a difficult presumption to overcome, it is also very 
expensive to prove. See Depoorter & Walker, supra note 1, at 344. 
 104 Depoorter & Walker, supra note 1, at 344. 
 105 See Litman, Real Copyright Reform, supra note 24, at 27-28 (“A different but equally pressing 
set of problems derives from the tangled snarls attending licensing of copyrighted works.”); 
see also Bitton, supra note 51, at 71 (explaining that overprotection expands protection to in-
clude the building blocks of creativity, therefore stifling it). See generally James Gibson, Risk 
Aversion and Rights Accretion in Intellectual Property Law, 116 YALE L.J. 882, 887-92 (2007) (indi-
cating that, because most individuals are risk-averse, licensing customs reduce the perceived 
scope of permissible use). 
 106 See Geiger, supra note 15, at 428 (“Most of the time, in order to comply with the law, a 
creator of a derivate work must clear rights associated with the use of the source material.”). 
 107 Id. at 431; see also Neil Weinstock Netanel, Copyright and a Democratic Civil Society, 106 YALE 
L.J. 283, 378 (1996) (“Given copyright owners’ propensity to private censorship and system-
atic ability to demand supracompetitive license fees, copyright owners’ expansive control over 
transformative uses unduly stifles the creative reformulation of existing expression . . . .”). 
 108 See Note, supra Section II.D.1. 
 109 See Depoorter & Walker, supra note 1, at 342. 
 110 See Geiger, supra note 15, at 445. 
 111 Id. at 445. 
 112 See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2018) (“A ‘joint work’ is a work prepared by two or more authors 
with the intention that their contributions be merged into inseparable or interdependent parts 
of a unitary whole.”). 
 113 See infra Section III.A. (providing an explanation and discussion of anticommons). 
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collaborate on projects and contribute to one common end product. United 
States law defaults to joint authorship rights unless otherwise specifically re-
nounced in a formal writing between all of the contributors to a work.114 This 
presents an issue in two situations: licensing and alleged infringement. 
First, joint authorship rights are obstacles to those seeking licenses. These 
overlapping rights create a thicket that increases transaction costs and disincen-
tivizes creativity.115 Frequently, the identity of the owner of the licensed work is 
difficult to ascertain.116 As Heller stated, “[i]f people hold multiple rights to ex-
clude each other from a resource, they must incur the transaction costs of finding 
out with whom to negotiate.”117 Thus, a crucial first step in licensing is ripe with 
issues. Because the copyright can be held equally by all joint contributors, deter-
mining which parties to negotiate with presents a daunting hurdle for those seek-
ing a license.118 Further, because there are so many “rights owners” in joint 
works, obtaining each owner’s permission—a requirement of a successful licens-
ing deal—is extremely difficult.119 The current licensing system, therefore, places 
the fate of future creators in the hands of those who contributed yesterday.120 
Second, joint authorship rights present issues when infringement is alleged. 
As Miriam Bitton notes, “[w]hen there are many contributors to the develop-
ment. . .and each contributor applies a license to their contribution, the question 
of who is authorized to enforce the license when copyright infringement occurs 
 
 114 See 17 U.S.C. § 201(c) (2018) (emphasis added) (“In the absence of an express transfer of the 
copyright or of any rights under it, the owner of copyright in the collective work is presumed to 
have acquired only the privilege of reproducing and distributing the contribution as part of 
that particular collective work, any revision of that collective work, and any later collective 
work in the same series.”). 
 115 Heller, Anticommons, supra note 57, at 639 n.94 (explaining that obtaining the appropriate 
consent “may be enough to deter long-term investment”). 
 116 See Bitton, supra note 51, at 80; see also Geiger, supra note 15, at 430 (“Clearing rights can 
also be a very challenging process as it is not always easy to identify rights holders.”); see also 
Litman, Real Copyright Reform, supra note 24, at 20 (“A creator or distributor seeking to exploit 
works in new media, though, faces daunting problems in identifying the rightsholder entitled 
to license its uses and negotiating the terms of the licenses.”). 
 117 Heller, Anticommons, supra note 57, at 674. 
 118 See Litman, Real Copyright Reform, supra note 24, at 20 (“A creator. . .faces daunting prob-
lems in identifying the rightsholder entitled to license its uses and negotiating the terms of the 
licenses.”); see also Bitton, supra note 51, at 80 (noting that identification of rights holders is an 
issue in licensing). 
 119 See Bitton, supra note 51, at 80-81 (“[B]ecause there are so many owners. . . each owner’s 
permission must be sought in order to carry out a licensing change.”). 
 120 See Geiger, supra note 15, at 444-45 (Joined Cases C-241/91 P & C-242/91 P, Radio 
Telefis Eireann (RTE) v. Comm’n, 1995 E.C.R. I-808, §§ 49-51); see also id. at 445 n. 173 (“The 
finding, however, took years of litigation, which demonstrates the need for internal mecha-
nisms inside copyright to avoid these kinds of situations from the start.”). 
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is unclear.”121Thus, a creator may find themselves liable to either one, or many, 
rights holders for misappropriating one single work. 
The joint authorship scheme, for obvious reasons, is ripe with potential col-
lective action problems.122 This presents many issues for creators and authors. 
At least, individually, it presents the potential for holdouts.123 At most, when 
viewed collectively, licensing thickets resemble the foundations of an anticom-
mons. Further, more fundamentally, this enforcement of private censorship 
“moves copyright radically away from the spirit from which it emerged in the 
eighteenth century and from its cultural and social function.”124 
Simply put, without modifying our conception of copying to incorporate our 
modern understanding of human creativity, indivisible copyrights granted to 
joint authors will produce a tragedy of the anticommons. Fear of infringement 
liability and high transaction costs of licensing negotiations will stifle the very 
creation that intellectual property law purports to incentivize. 
III. ANALYSIS 
A. TRAGEDY OF THE ANTICOMMONS 
The combination of pervasive collaboration, increased saturation of copy-
rights, and the fundamental nature of human creativity presents a unique im-
pending problem. An anticommons is present where there is a breakdown of 
coordination of rights holders with overlapping rights in the same property. As 
a result, the underlying property becomes the victim of underuse, ultimately pre-
venting socially desirable outcomes. The threat of an anticommons is uniquely 
alarming in the context of intellectual property rights. Because intellectual prop-
erty is inherently intangible, the rights associated with it are unaffected by the 
size or substantiality of the work itself.125 
First, collaboration among multiple creators presents a novel problem. As 
collaboration becomes more commonplace due to technological advancement, 
the potential for an anticommons increases. Today, joint authors own indivisible 
 
 121 Bitton, supra note 51, at 80 (“[T]he current licensing system gives today’s contributors 
too much control over the future decisions of tomorrow’s contributors.”) (citing Molly Shaffer 
Van Houweling, The New Servitudes, 96 GEO. L.J. 885, 941-43 (2008)). 
 122 Heller, Anticommons, supra note 57, at 639 (“Because multiple parties may hold the same 
right, almost any use . . . requires the agreement of multiple parties.”). 
 123 See Asay, supra note 56, at 292 (“[T]he paradigmatic example of an anticommons is when 
a rights holder refuses to allow others to use the common resource on the basis of her rights.”). 
 124 See Geiger, supra note 15, at 431. 
 125 Compare intellectual property to real property. For example, an owner of a 1-inch parcel 
of land is limited in their enforceability of their property rights due to the size of their parcel. 
In order to enforce their rights, a third party would have to interact with their tiny parcel. I 
recognize that modern conceptions of property rights may present a tragedy of the anticom-
mons, as demonstrated by the “bundle of sticks” metaphor. These rights, however, are still 
limited by the size of the real property itself. 
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rights in the entirety of the creative work, irrespective of their contribution. 
Courts rarely look into the amount or quality of the contribution.126 This stems 
from a fear that judges will be the final determination of what qualifies as crea-
tively valuable. While a credible fear, the alternative presents an equally negative 
result. The classification of joint authorship relies primarily on the individual 
contributors and their mindsets.127 Determining, post hoc, what the intention of 
the creators was at the time of creation is difficult in itself. When considered 
during the course of litigation, it creates a serious problem of hindsight bias fa-
voring joint authorship. As a result of frequent finding of joint authorship,128 the 
rights of the owners often overlap significantly. Trends in authorship and tech-
nological advancements, however, demonstrate that the creation of works today 
may involve hundreds of authors, each with indivisible rights in the whole 
work.129 If modern copyright law continues to ignore these present trends of 
collaboration, its outdated rights-granting scheme will harm future creators by 
increasing transaction costs beyond that which makes creating worthwhile.130 
Increased collaboration, and thus joint authorship rights, are chilling enough 
in their own right. Combined with the seemingly limitless grant of copyright pro-
tection, it creates a maze that creators must navigate in order to express them-
selves without risking an infringement suit and is reminiscent of the beginning 
of a tragedy of the anticommons.131 
Second, overextension of copyrights contributes to the problem as well. His-
torically, copyrights were narrowly granted to works that fit certain, well-defined 
criteria. Creators of the past were aware of certain categories of works that qual-
ified for copyrights and could avoid liability. Today, more works are copyrighta-
ble than ever, blurring the lines of what qualifies for protection. Consequently, 
today’s creators are not on notice as to what protection a work of authorship 
warrants and what it does not. Courts—fearing being the last word on artistic 
merit—are reluctant to engage in a substantive analysis of what qualifies as “cre-
ative.” Works are merely analyzed for their “originality” instead, which is not 
much of a standard at all.132 This fear creates a presumption that works qualify 
 
 126 In Bleinstein, the Court actually discourages courts from engaging in a valuation of a 
work’s creative value when determining protectability. See Bleinstein v. Donaldson Litho-
graphing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 251 (1903). 
 127 See Note, supra Section II.D.2. 
 128 See Note, supra, note 112. 
 129 See 17 U.S.C.A. § 201(c) (2018); see also Note, supra note 119 and accompanying text. 
 130 By transaction costs, I am referring specifically to the costs associated with identifying 
rights holders and licensing negotiations. See also discussion Note, supra, Section II.D.2. 
 131 See discussion Note, supra Section II.C.; see also Guthrie, supra note 14, at 11 (explaining 
that complex relationships between publishers and authors “are exceedingly complex for au-
thors, musicians, photographers, and other content creators to navigate”). 
 132 See generally Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340 (1991). 
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as copyrightable, so long as they are in a “tangible medium” 133 and are moder-
ately original. 
Third, the nature of human creativity presents a unique problem in light of 
the oversaturation of copyrights.134 Human creativity necessarily relies on build-
ing upon preexisting works. As such, it would follow that some moderate amount 
of borrowing would be permitted in order to foster future creativity. Copyright 
doctrine, both in its substance and form, does not appropriately account for this 
fact of human nature. 
In substance, the doctrine does not reflect modern conceptions of creativity. 
An analysis of the history of copyright indicates that the conception of author-
ship has changed significantly since the Copyright Act of 1790.135 This change, 
however, has not been reflected in the substance of the doctrine. While copyright 
law has somewhat morphed to accommodate a change in copyrightable subject 
matter, the doctrine has failed to proportionately reflect the same change in its 
concept of infringement. Qualifying subject matter is growing larger, while the 
freedom to use such works remains limited. 
In form, the doctrine is shrinking the use of copyrightable subject matter. 
The extreme costs of litigation and high damage awards push most copyright 
infringement suits out of the eyes of the law. Because infringement claims rarely 
see their day in court, the likelihood of rights holders overextending the scope 
of their own rights is high. Further, the extremely high statutory damage awards 
alone are enough to scare away even the most formidable, determined creator. 
The combination of high litigation costs and high damages awards has developed 
a robust area of private law, made up of settlements, unnecessary licensing agree-
ments, and overly broad copyright scope. This private law allows for essentially 
no exercise of creative borrowing of other works. On one hand, those who dare 
to copy are at risk of being involved in costly litigation or costly settlement. On 
the other hand, for some, the price of creation is too high of a burden to justify 
creation in the first place. 
It is important to note that Heller himself downplayed the potential of a cop-
yright-induced anticommons. He has suggested that when compared with patent 
law, “copyright law’s tragedy of the anticommons is less costly” because the fair 
use doctrine allows for the use of copyrighted materials without necessarily re-
quiring permission of the owner.136 While he downplayed its significance, he 
acknowledged that underuse may occur—even in light of fair use—because 
transaction costs and potential for rent seeking.137 
 
 133 See 17 U.S.C. § 102 (2018). 
 134 See discussion Note, supra Section II.B. (explaining human creativity). 
 135 See discussion Note, supra Section II.A. (detailing a brief history of copyright law). 
 136 See Asay, supra note 56, at 329 (quoting Michael A. Heller, The Boundaries of Private Property, 
108 YALE L.J. 1163, 1175 n.61 (1999)). 
 137 See Michael A. Heller, The Boundaries of Private Property, 108 YALE L.J. 1163, 1175 (1999) 
[hereinafter Heller, Boundaries]. 
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His lack of concern, however, is disturbing when viewed in light of present 
developments in authorship. While transaction costs and rent seeking were likely 
a problem in 1999 when Heller authored his article, they are even more concern-
ing today. Rent seeking and transaction costs are extremely high entry costs for 
creators today.138 The massive sphere of private law that has developed as a result 
indicates that Heller’s reliance on the fair use doctrine as a protection against 
overprotection and underuse is no longer applicable. 
B. EXISTING DEFENSES ARE INADEQUATE 
Defenses for copyright infringement are inadequate both in their substance 
and in their application given the demonstrated importance that copying plays in 
human creativity. First, copyright defenses are inadequate in their substance. As 
discussed in Section I.A & B, creation of artistic works is increasingly collabora-
tive. Fair use, however, has remained stagnant. As it stands, fair use principles do 
not appropriately account for our new understanding and conception of author-
ship. Thus, it fails to adequately incentivize creation and preserve elements of the 
public domain. The fair use doctrine generally assesses four factors: (1) the pur-
pose and character of the use; (2) nature of the copyrighted work; (3) amount 
and substantiality of the copyrighted work used; and (4) the effect on the marker 
for or value of the original work. The most influential factor for the fair use 
inquiry is the purpose and character of the use, which measures the “transform-
ativeness” of the alleged infringing work.139 The importance of this factor indi-
cates that some forms of copying are accepted, namely parody. However, it is 
unclear—based on current precedent—whether subsequent adaptations of cop-
yrighted material qualify as “transformative” or not. Therefore, relying on fair 
use as a protection for this necessary element of creation is inadequate protection 
for creators in the present and near future. 
Second, defenses are inadequate to protect creators because they are applied 
in a proportionately small group of infringement cases. Copyright infringement 
claims have developed a sphere of private law that is not subject to judicial re-
view.140 As a result, potential defendant-infringers do not have the chance to 
employ these defenses in response to infringement claims. 
 
 138 See discussion Note, supra Section II.D. (outlining problems that result from the overex-
tension of copyrights to institutional stakeholders). 
 139 See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 579 (1994) (explaining that “the 
more transformative the new work, the less will be the significance of other factors”). 
 140 See discussion Note, supra Section II.D.1. 
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C. CHANGES ARE NECESSARY 
Perhaps it is time that the United States follow its international peers and 
modernize its copyright laws to allow for limited borrowing.141 If the goal of 
copyright is to incentivize creation, then it is important to understand and incor-
porate our understanding of the creative process, which undeniably involves 
building upon preexisting works.142 Thus, an important first step would be rec-
ognizing the “reality and importance of copying in the creation of new works.”143 
This recognition would advance the core goals of copyright: to promote the pro-
gress of science and the useful arts.144 
 
1. Hierarchy of Protection 
The United States Copyright Office should develop a categorization system 
that classifies certain works based on their requisite amount of creativity. Each 
tier of creativity would have increasingly strong protections, in which the most 
creative works receive the strongest protections. Works that are less original and 
creative, those that incorporate more of which belongs to the public, would be 
afforded less protection as a direct consequence of borrowing from the public 
domain. Similarly, statutory damage amounts should also reflect the tier system 
developed by the Copyright Office. This categorization is not novel to the realm 
of copyright. The idea that some works of authorship deserve more protection 
is engrained in the second factor of the fair use analysis, which questions the 
nature of the copyrighted work. This factor acknowledges that “some works are 
closer to the core of intended copyright protection than others.”145 In its appli-
cation, this factor raises the threshold for proving fair use much higher when 
highly creative works are copied. Applying this factor ex ante, rather than during 
the course of litigation, would further encourage the production of highly crea-
tive works.   
A tier system would incentivize creation of highly original and creative works 
because authors would be motivated to achieve the highest tier of protection. 
Similarly, those works that borrow much from the public domain would permit 
more use, therefore incentivizing creators to build off of the raw materials within 
the public domain. 
 
 
 
 141 See Bitton, supra note 51, at 94 (“[I]f we want copyright law to serve as an engine of 
creativity, we need to adjust it to the new reality.”). 
 142 See Jeanne C. Fromer, A Psychology of Intellectual Property, 104 NW. U.L. REV. 1441, 1443-44 
(2010); see also id. at 1444 (describing how accounting for the process of creativity will provide 
meaningful insight into how intellectual property laws should be structured). 
 143 Arewa, supra note 32, at 517. 
 144 See id.(citing U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.). 
 145 Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 586 (1994). 
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2. Mandatory and Permissive Judicial Review 
While settlement is a favorable tool in litigation because it removes the bur-
den from the judicial system, that is the precise reason why predatory infringe-
ment actions exist. Judicial review is necessary in order to restore balance in the 
infringement sphere. The current development of private law outside of the pur-
view of the courts is one example of why judicial review is necessary. Presently, 
the limits of copyright doctrine are developed by institutional stakeholders who 
are incentivized to define the scope as broad as possible. While imposing judicial 
review availability would require more judicial intervention, it is necessary in or-
der to return copyright doctrine to its reasonable limitations. 
Congress should amend the Copyright Act to expand judicial review of set-
tlements of infringement lawsuits. First, the amendment should require judicial 
review of settlements that exceed a certain threshold dollar amount. This would 
both encourage lower settlement damage awards and would decrease predatory 
rights holder’s incentives to pursue non-meritous claims. Second, the amend-
ment should allow for judicial review of any settlement of a copyright infringe-
ment claim. Like the mandatory review, this would ensure that only meritous cop-
yright claims end in settlement. 
 
3. Modification of Statutory Defenses 
In order to effectively incentivize the creation of artistic works, the Copyright 
Act should be amended to accommodate for the present understanding of hu-
man creativity. Doing so would ensure that creativity is incentivized, the central 
underlying goal of copyright protections. This amendment should recognize cop-
ying as a fundamental element to the development of new works and as central 
to human creativity. 
Ultimately, this would require that Congress consider the viewpoints and mo-
tivations of a variety of stakeholders. Rather than merely drafting a copyright 
statute that favors institutional big-wigs, Congress should involve cognitive sci-
entists and psychologists in the drafting of the statute to ensure that creativity is 
understood and incorporated appropriately. Incorporating the realities of crea-
tivity would ensure that the purpose of copyright law, incentivizing creation, re-
mains central in the statute’s language and application.   
IV. CONCLUSION 
Copyright law boasts an extensive historical pedigree, beginning in 1710 with 
the Statute of Anne. The marketplace at the time of copyright’s inception was 
very limited, both by what and who qualified for exclusion rights. Copyright is 
unique from its other intellectual property subcategories, in that it is much 
broader in what it purports to protect. This Note argues that the problem with 
modern copyright doctrine is not copyright in itself, but the seemingly limitless 
grant of rights on an insufficiently particularized basis. The solution offered is 
two-fold: the extension of copyright protection should be more limited, and the 
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allowance of copying should be broader. This would ensure that copyright doc-
trine most efficiently incentivizes creation, by protecting what is creative yet al-
lowing individuals to build upon existing works. 
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